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ABSTRACT: A recent line of argument insists that replacing democracy with markets would 
improve social decision making due to markets’ superior use of knowledge. Yet these arguments 
are flawed by unrealistic assumptions, unfair comparisons, and a neglect of the epistemic limits 
of markets. In reality, the epistemic advantages of markets over democracy are circumscribed 
and often illusory. A recognition of markets’ epistemic limits can, however, provide guidance for 
designing institutions in ways that capture the advantages of both.  
 
Keywords: democracy; democratic competence; epistemic democracy; markets; rational 
ignorance. 
 
Kevin J. Elliott, kelliott13@murraystate.edu, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at 
Murray State University, 5A-8 Faculty Hall, Murray, KY 42071. 
2 
 
In recent years, a formidable set of arguments seeking to establish the superiority of markets over 
democracy as a means of coordinating society has emerged in the work of such scholars as 
Samuel DeCanio (2014), Mark Pennington (2011), and Ilya Somin (2013). This work combines 
arguments and evidence from political science, economics, and public choice to indict 
democratic decision making and celebrate that of markets. The conclusion of these authors is that 
markets make better decisions than democracy, in the sense of leading to better outcomes, 
because they better generate and take advantage of the knowledge needed to produce good 
outcomes.  
Though many of these arguments are familiar, two considerations make them especially 
powerful today. First, the rise of epistemic democratic theory has led many democratic theorists 
to recognize that at least some of democracy’s attraction is conditional on its performance in 
producing good outcomes (Schwartzberg 2015). This framework enhances the theoretical 
significance of the pro-market arguments of DeCanio, Pennington, and Somin, as all of them 
compare markets to democracy on the epistemic dimension. Those who agree that outcomes 
matter are therefore pressured to say that markets should be favored if, on epistemic grounds, we 
have reason to think that markets can be expected to produce good outcomes more reliably than 
democracy can.  
The second consideration enhancing the force of these pro-market arguments is that many 
of them engage deeply with empirical evidence to bolster their claims. This is significant because 
it offers the arguments a veneer of scientific validity that they might lack if put solely in terms of 
economic theory or rational choice. It also thereby helps inoculate the arguments from the claim 
that they are little more than elitist prejudice.  
In this article, I show that the purported epistemic advantages of markets do not stand up 
to scrutiny and fall short of demonstrating the epistemic inferiority of democracy. We should 
therefore treat the conclusions of DeCanio, Pennington, and Somin with skepticism. In 
responding to these arguments, I introduce two underappreciated epistemic limits to markets that 
should further temper our reliance on them to improve social coordination and decision making, 
especially vis-à-vis democracy.  
 
Markets in Political Theory 
Political theorists have taken a renewed interest in markets in recent years. Since this is largely 
due to the rise of economic inequality and the flow of money into politics in recent decades, the 
focus of much of this work concerns the question of whether market transactions in some goods 
should not be allowed. Debra Satz (2010), for instance, argues that markets in such goods as 
human body parts and sexual and reproductive services are troubling because they can prevent 
parties from interacting with each other as equals, often by reinforcing social patterns of 
inequality. Others have argued that markets distort the proper valuing of certain goods. Michael 
Sandel (2012) argues that a great many goods, including the ability to avoid queues and the 
names of buildings, should not be for sale because selling them in markets goes against 
principles of distribution that are inherent in the goods or are found in our shared social 
understandings of their nature. These authors do not reject markets in toto but rather claim that 
moral limits on markets should prevent the sale of certain goods.  
The discussion here, however, will focus on the epistemic performance and limits of 
markets, not their morality. The question will be the overall quality of outcomes that markets 
generate for society rather than their fittingness or appropriateness given the value of persons or 
certain goods. This also means setting aside such intrinsic values as freedom and equality in this 
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discussion, since both markets and democracy can promote them in different ways. In eschewing 
these possible lines of argument, I seek to meet the challenge put forward by the pro-market 
arguments on their own terms. 
In addition, I am interested in markets in a more general sense than Satz or Sandel, since 
they focus on markets’ appropriateness for certain specific goods whose character recommends 
special treatment. Instead, I consider markets as society-wide systems of coordination through 
the mutually entered-into transactions of individual buyers and sellers, which generate particular 
distributions of social resources (Lindblom 2001, 4; Satz 2010, 15-16). The question is whether 
markets in this sense do a better job than democracy, where democracy refers to a set of 
collective decision-making procedures in which inclusive mass publics or representatives elected 
by them choose policies that shape the distribution of social resources.  
Part of my aim is to bring a perspective from political theory to this debate, rather than 
from economics or its affiliated fields. I therefore pass over without comment market failures 
established by economists, such as information asymmetries, which could be construed as 
epistemic problems. Instead, I want to concentrate on two epistemic limits that have received less 
attention because they are most clearly seen when we compare markets with democracy and 
when one approaches the task of comparison with the tools and perspective of political theory. 
One of the advantages of this perspective, we shall see, is to bring a more sophisticated account 
of democracy to the debate, one that better reflects actual democratic practice.  
An important objection to epistemic theory, and thus to this entire debate, is that it fails to 
take disagreement seriously. I must briefly address this objection. The claim is that since we do 
not agree about what would count as a “better” decision, a theory justifying democracy on that 
basis is useless. This matters because if we cannot tell what could count as a better decision, we 
have no basis for assessing the comparative performance of markets and democracy, whether on 
epistemic grounds or any others. However, even if we cannot agree about what a relatively good 
decision would be, one substantive thing that we can all agree to is that decisions should be 
unbiased. Thus, I argue below that markets systematically bias social decision making in ways 
that are epistemically problematic. I specifically argue that there are two epistemic limits to 
market decision making. The first of these is that markets bias social decision making against 
non-materialistic values; the second consists in the fact that markets bias social decision making 
in a manner that, if endorsed by a theorist, would commit her to begging the epistemic question.  
 
 The Epistemic Case for Markets over Democracy 
What, then, is the case for markets having an epistemic advantage over democracy? Perhaps the 
most basic advantage, emphasized by Somin (2013), is that markets incentivize decision makers 
to become informed and to combat their cognitive biases in making buying decisions, while 
democratic citizens have no such incentive in making voting decisions. Because the outcome of 
an election is shared by all, and because no individual is likely to determine the outcome through 
his or her lone vote, voters lack a sufficient incentive to ensure that their voting decisions are 
made well, in light of all the relevant information. In addition, would-be voters have an incentive 
to free ride on the efforts of others to become informed and vote (Downs 1957). Market 
participants, on the other hand, have a strong incentive to ensure that their decisions are well 
founded, since they face all of the consequences of their decisions themselves and are singly 
responsible for making them. The hypothesis that citizens lack a similar incentive to gather 
relevant information is termed “rational ignorance.”  
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In addition, Pennington and DeCanio, following Hayek (1945), argue that markets make 
more efficient use of information than democracy because they can tap and aggregate latent, 
non-linguistic knowledge in ways that democracy cannot (Pennington 2003; DeCanio 2014, 
646). The main carriers of information in markets are prices, and prices emerge unintentionally 
from the aggregated buying and selling decisions of people who may never otherwise 
communicate with each other (Pennington 2003, 731). In making these decisions, people draw 
on all the knowledge they possess—not just the knowledge they are consciously aware of or can 
put into words—and communicate it to others through the price mechanism. They are able to 
make maximal use of their knowledge and share it widely because they act on it in making 
buying or selling decisions, rather than talking about it (ibid.). This grants markets a decisive 
advantage over democracy, since deliberative forms of democracy, which dominate the 
literature, privilege information that can be put into linguistic form and offered discursively in 
public debate. The market’s price-based mechanism of knowledge aggregation thereby undoes a 
linguistic bias in democratic deliberation that leads to loss and inefficiency in how democracy 
handles information. Markets are able to capture and make use of information that would be lost 
to a deliberative democracy. It does so, moreover, without the need for a central authority such 
as a democratic assembly to comprehend the whole or process the information aggregated in 
prices. 
Another advantage of markets stems from the asymmetric difficulty of the political 
choice situation faced by voters as compared to the market choice situation faced by consumers. 
DeCanio (2014) argues that the political choice situation faced by voters is particularly difficult 
due to three features: the exclusivity of political choices, the bundling of policies within those 
choices, and the lack of a tenable metric for making tradeoffs.  
The central case of democratic choice is among parties or candidates seeking political 
office. This choice gives the occupants of the offices exclusive control over decision making 
until their term expires. This exclusivity makes it impossible to compare the job that the winners 
do with the job that the losers could have done, had they won. Voters cannot compare the costs 
and effects of the rival baskets of policies that candidates would produce if elected (DeCanio 
2014, 643; Somin 2013, 124). The same is not true for most market decisions, for which 
competition simultaneously presents products that can be readily compared. Such comparisons in 
politics require considering counterfactual scenarios that are difficult or impossible to forecast.  
A different epistemic problem with the voting task is that the decision is singular and yet 
influences a vast bundle of policies. A fully rational decision would seem to require learning 
about all of these policies and understanding how the contending parties would act on each of 
them, what the effects of each policy would be, and how the overall bundles and their 
consequences compare (DeCanio 2014). Yet there is no practical way to disaggregate the voting 
task so as to render consideration of each policy an epistemically distinct task. Market choices, 
by contrast, are generally distinct, so they can be approached piecemeal rather than all at once.  
Exacerbating the problem of policy bundling is that political decisions lack a common 
metric for making tradeoffs between different policies. As DeCanio (2014, 642) observes, “it is 
difficult to compare a unit increase in medical insurance with a unit decrease in environmental 
protection, and even harder for voters to make these calculations across multiple issues” 
simultaneously. DeCanio quotes Gabriel Almond, who noted that there is “no simple policy 
currency in which the cost of alternative policies can be computed” (ibid., 643). However, none 
of this is true of markets, because money provides a ready metric of comparison for all manner 
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of goods. This makes the task of comparison much easier for market decisions than for 
democratic ones.  
Epistemic challenges to democracy do not end with citizens’ voting decisions. They 
extend also to parties and representatives who (on some accounts) wish to supply policies that 
the voters will approve. The same features of exclusivity, policy bundling, and lack of a common 
policy metric beset their decision making. Exclusivity robs representatives of the opportunity to 
learn from competitors and reduces the pressure to innovate. Policy bundling makes it difficult 
for representatives to interpret their main source of information about citizen preferences—votes 
in an election—because the signal offered by such votes is too imprecise to guide policy choice 
and design (ibid., 644). They cannot know if citizens voted for them due to their stance on 
foreign policy, or against them for their environmental policies. All of this is made worse by the 
lack of a common policy metric, which hobbles parties and representatives in making the 
tradeoffs in their policy agenda needed to improve their performance in the next election. These 
difficulties do not beset market actors, for whom informational feedback is intensely specific and 
non-ambiguous—the product sells or not—and for whom the ever-present pressure of 
competition requires adaptation and innovation. If we assume, as do those (such as DeCanio) 
who operate in a social-choice framework, that the task of representatives is to supply policies of 
which voters approve, the task is made exceedingly difficult by these endemic features of 
democratic choice. 
These arguments can be summarized as follows: 
1. rational ignorance 
2. embodied or non-linguistic knowledge 
3. exclusivity of the decision situation 
4. policy bundling as a feature of the decision situation 
The discussion thus far may seem to suggest that these arguments make for a single, 
coherent epistemic case for markets, but I do not intend this suggestion. The arguments have 
roots in several different theoretical traditions, including Austrian economics, social choice, 
neoclassical economics, and the new institutionalism. It is possible that there are tensions 
between them that prevent them from cohering. Yet we need not assume that they form a unified 
argument. We can instead think of them as alternative routes to the same broad conclusion: 
markets’ epistemic superiority over democracy. Such eclecticism may strike some as 
philosophically untidy but it allows us to focus on the live political question at issue: will 
markets or democracy do a better job for society? This focus comes at a cost, however, in that in 
answering in the negative, I cannot deny that other routes derived from these or other theoretical 
roots may yet succeed.  
 
 Problems with Rational Ignorance 
The first argument for the epistemic superiority of markets is that voters lack the incentive 
possessed by market participants to properly inform themselves, by dint of the fact that market 
decisions are made—and the consequences felt—individually. This argument against democracy 
combines the venerable thesis of rational ignorance with a favorable comparison to market 
decision making. However, there are problems with both parts of the argument.  
First, rational ignorance is a prediction about how voters will behave derived from 
rational-choice analysis, yet these predictions are by and large inaccurate (Green and Shapiro 
1994, ch. 4). The failure of rational-choice analysis can be seen in the case of voting. The logic 
predicting that citizens lack the incentive to inform themselves also predicts that they will lack 
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the incentive to vote. Yet they do vote, by the hundreds of millions. It also fails to explain 
widespread regularities in voting patterns found in most electoral democracies. Take, for 
instance, the observed regularity that first-order, national elections outpoll second-order, state or 
local elections. Rational choice would predict higher turnout in a smaller polity, such as a city or 
state, since one’s chance of being decisive is much higher; yet we observe the opposite. Or 
consider the empirical regularity that turnout varies substantially across demographic groups, 
often in puzzling ways. When the more educated vote disproportionately often, for instance, it 
suggests that those who are best situated to understand the logic of collective action act the least 
in line with its predictions (Geys 2006). Moreover, on the rational-choice analysis, all members 
of a polity lack the incentive to vote equally, not differentially. Rational-choice theorists offer up 
many explanations for these failures of the predictions generated by the theory, yet as Donald P. 
Green and Ian Shapiro (1994) argue in their classic critique, these have the character of post-hoc 
rationalizations. The point here is not simply that the rational-choice theory of voting is wrong; it 
is that there are evidently other forces shaping the propensity of individuals to vote, forces strong 
enough to negate the predictions of the theory in most ordinary circumstances. This renders 
rational choice an unreliable source of predictions about human behavior—including the 
propensity of voters in large electorates to gather information (or not to).  
Thus, we see a strikingly similar pattern of failures in the predictions of rational-
ignorance theory. Like voting, the most glaring failure is that millions of people do in fact gather 
and retain large amounts of political information, despite the theory’s prediction that people lack 
sufficient incentive to do so. Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, for instance, found that 
the top 30 percent of a nationally representative sample scored an average of 71 percent on their 
wide-ranging 51-item knowledge survey, implying that roughly a hundred million Americans do 
not behave as the theory predicts (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 154). Rational-ignorance 
theory also fails to explain variations in political knowledge, such as why those with more 
education have more political knowledge even though they are in the best position to understand 
what a waste gathering such information is likely to be; or why knowledge about some issues 
varies according to race and gender (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, ch. 4). Moreover, there is 
evidence that knowledge levels vary considerably among democracies, tracking not the size of 
the electorate, as the theory would predict, but institutional features. For instance, higher political 
knowledge levels tend to be found in more complicated political environments, such as 
parliamentary and multiparty systems, suggesting that knowledge levels are partly endogenous to 
the institutional environment (Fortunato, Stevenson, and Vonnahme 2016). Thus, rational-
ignorance theory fails to help us understand the world we observe. Even if these patterns can be 
explained in ways that do not violate the theory, the theory does not itself illuminate them.  
What I want to suggest is that instead of trying to patch up the theory with amendments, 
we should replace it with a fundamentally different theory that better accounts for the basic 
outlines of observable reality. What we need is a new starting point for analysis, and there is no 
shortage of alternatives in political science. We might, for instance, view voting and political 
learning socially, as something groups of people do, rather than as individual behavior. This 
would allow us to more clearly consider the ways that social meanings, expectations, and 
identities shape voting behavior. The significance of this step is that it makes both the “paradox 
of voting” and the rational-ignorance critique of democracy simply disappear as problems. Such 
a theory might, for example, explain why people vote by pointing out that other people like them 
tend to vote, instead of looking at payoffs to individuals. Likewise, a social approach might 
highlight the fact that those who are knowledgeable about politics substantially overlap with 
7 
 
traditionally powerful groups, and also with those who participate in politics at higher rates. 
Political knowledge, on such an analysis, would mainly reflect the social distribution of power, 
not the incentives facing atomized individuals.  
Such an understanding of political knowledge would transform the diagnosis of the 
problem of public ignorance. Rather than change our institutions to accommodate citizens’ 
supposedly fixed and paltry stock of information, we should instead aim to spread power more 
equally, so that more groups acquire the habits of learning about politics that powerful groups 
display today. There is little reason, in this light, to favor Somin’s preferred institutional 
arrangement—decentralized “foot voting in the private sector”— since democracy remains a 
viable option.  
We know, moreover, that consumers are not especially well informed about their market 
choices (Scitovsky 1950; Akerlof 1970; Morgan 1978; DeCanio 2014, 638). Consumers seem to 
use cues and shortcuts such as recommendations from trusted sources in making their decisions, 
just as voters do (Claxton, Fry, and Portis 1974; Furse, Punj, and Stewart 1984; Lupia 1994). Far 
from markets having an advantage, it seems that voters and consumers use similar cognitive 
tools in both domains. This is, indeed, what we ought to expect, given that voters and consumers 
are one and the same. 
One might think that the abundant empirical evidence showing that voters lack factual 
information about politics confirms that the informational incentives faced by voters are can be 
explained by rational ignorance (Bennett 1989; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Somin 2013). Yet 
there are severe methodological problems with this evidence. First, it consists primarily of 
answers to pop-quiz questions that are asked of citizens out of the blue in short telephone, 
Internet, or in-person surveys. These questions are likely to underestimate what citizens know by 
assessing their knowledge in potentially distracting contexts in a format that discourages recall 
by stripping questions of cues that could aid memory (Graber 1994). Such measures of ignorance 
also underestimate citizen knowledge because they rely solely upon verbal or written recall, 
neglecting that much political information today is conveyed visually. Markus Prior (2014) has 
found that visual measurements of knowledge significantly boost detected levels of political 
information. Motivation is another serious problem with these measurements, since citizens have 
little incentive to expend the effort to answer such out-of-the-blue questions from an anonymous 
pollster on the phone. Knowledge surveys that pay respondents for correct answers substantially 
increase correctly answered questions, suggesting that traditional measurements of citizen 
knowledge systematically underestimate it (Prior and Lupia 2008; Bullock et al. 2015).  
 
Issue-Specific Political Knowledge and the Single-Issue Standard 
More fundamental than these methodological objections, however, is that it is far from obvious 
that the levels of political knowledge observed in the public are insufficient for the tasks of 
citizens in representative democracy. The information needed for citizens to perform well in the 
voting booth is relative to the complexity of the task. We thus need a standard of what level of 
information would be needed to complete a citizen’s core tasks before we can assess whether 
observed knowledge levels are problematic.  
Somin (2013, 39-53) recognizes this and compares (what he deduces are) the 
informational demands of four prominent democratic theories to the information citizens have, as 
revealed by knowledge surveys of the sort I have just criticized. Yet his pessimistic conclusion is 
not warranted, not just because the survey evidence is unreliable, but also because he does not 
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take seriously enough a standard that makes low information demands on citizens due to 
specialization.  
By this standard, citizens need to know enough about a small number of issues, or even a 
single issue, to be able to identify bad policy ideas or performance on those issues. Call this the 
single-issue standard. Somin himself recognizes that “a given stock of information is, other 
things equal, more likely to be enough to handle a narrow range of issues than a broad one“ 
(Somin 2013, 141); thus, he contends that if we were to reduce the number of issues on the 
public agenda, voters’ decision making would improve. This argument redounds against Somin’s 
worries about the problem of public ignorance, however, as it suggests that single-issue voting 
may solve the problem.  
Is knowing about a single issue really enough to cast an informed vote? Such an idea cuts 
strongly against the longstanding view that an informed decision is one that (at least) 
encompasses all of the relevant information and considerations. Focusing on just one issue may 
seem to constrict the scope of the decision to an implausible degree, guaranteeing myopic 
outcomes.  
This is where the second type of specialization comes in: specialization in the functions 
of citizens compared to other democratic offices, particularly elected representatives. Typically, 
citizens’ role is limited to making electoral choices between just a few candidates or parties for 
office. They are not asked to draft or defend complex policy proposals, as are political elites. 
Theirs is a relatively simple task, and this simplicity reduces the amount of information needed 
to do it well (Lupia 2006). It also grants citizens latitude to make seemingly myopic voting 
decisions on the basis of only one or a few issues, since it is mainly elected representatives who 
make actual policy decisions. Representatives must take a wider view in order to complete the 
more demanding tasks associated with their role, including not just policy making but also 
managing the political agenda, balancing conflicting interests, and, especially, making tradeoffs. 
These difficult assignments are not shared by ordinary democratic citizens. However, by caring 
about one or a few issues and voting on the basis of those issues, citizens shape the electoral 
incentives of representatives such that the latter must be concerned about the quality of their 
performance, since there will be citizens watching and voting based on how well they do.1 This 
incentive is a powerful mechanism for improving democratic decisions and outcomes.  
Do citizens currently have the knowledge to meet such a standard? There has not been 
much empirical research on this question. One factor that has served to hamper such research has 
been the hegemony of the idea that political knowledge is general and hierarchical, such that 
some people simply know more about all aspects of politics than others. This assumption has 
profoundly shaped efforts to measure political knowledge. However, John Zaller, in an 
influential research paper for the American National Election Study (ANES), compared surveys 
                                                          
1 This raises the question of whether there will be a group of citizens concerned about every issue, as well 
as of whether the boundaries of issues can be defined meaningfully (Somin 2013, 106). These are real 
problems that can be solved by means of deliberation. It would be fatuous to claim that there are citizens 
vigilantly attending to every conceivable issue. But free political discussion allows for new issues to 
become better known and for political entrepreneurs to make discursive connections between issues and 
interests, generating attention for issues from existing groups who come to understand why they should 
care about them. The boundaries of each issue are those that emerge from social and political discussion 
of it, reflecting contemporary social and political understandings. Such definitions are never complete or 
unanimous and must always be contestable but, at any given time, typically provide sufficient guidance 
for practical purposes. 
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that assessed general political knowledge to surveys that assessed issue-specific knowledge and 
found that the latter actually did a better job of capturing what people know about politics (Zaller 
1986).2 Using issue-specific surveys, Shanto Iyengar (1990) has found substantial domain-
specificity in political knowledge. Amy Gershkoff (2006), too, found that people knew more 
about issues they thought were important. Others have found that citizens had more accurate 
information of candidates’ positions on issues they cared about (Krosnick 1990; Kim 2009). In a 
case study of Social Security, Michael Henderson (2014) found clear evidence that senior 
citizens learned more about the issue than the rest of the public and retained that information 
over time. Even studies usually cited to indicate that information is “hierarchical” find significant 
evidence of specialization. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 147, 151) find evidence of domain-
specific knowledge in several areas, despite the fact that their survey was poorly designed to 
discover it. While these studies comprise a significant body of empirical evidence, they remain 
suggestive and do not provide a sufficient evidentiary basis to draw strong inferences about 
citizens’ ability to meet the single-issue standard. More research in this area is needed. 
Nonetheless, it suggests that Somin’s conclusions about democracy’s epistemic infirmities are 
too hasty, since there is a realistic standard of good decisions that exploits specialization and is at 
least plausible according to the available evidence. The single-issue standard aligns with the 
realistic assumption that citizens’ knowledge of politics follows from their idiosyncratic interests 
in politics, such that they are likely to know a lot about the sliver of political issues that capture 
their interest but little about others. Such a specialized distribution of knowledge would almost 
certainly not register on a general knowledge survey, since issues an individual knew about 
would be excluded by chance due to the extremely large universe of possibly relevant political 
information, making the respondent appear more ignorant than he or she really is.  
 
 
 Information Bias and Scarcity Bias 
The second argument for the epistemic advantage of markets, advanced by Pennington, is that 
they make more efficient use of information than democracy because they can draw upon 
implicit or non-linguistic information and do not need to centralize it. However, voting also 
allows voters to make use of implicit knowledge. Voting is an action in the same way 
Pennington claims that a decision to buy something is. Individuals are able to draw upon all the 
information they possess in deciding how to act, including non-linguistic and subconsciously 
held information, whether the action is buying or voting.  
 Pennington seems to think that voting is precluded by deliberative democracy, but even 
the most deliberative of democratic theorists reserve an important role for elections (Manin, 
Stein, and Mansbridge 1987, 359; Cohen 1997, 75; Habermas 1998, 28; Fishkin 2009, 85-88). 
For them, deliberation precedes elections, helping to make preferences more enlightened, 
                                                          
2 Zaller’s conclusion that the ANES should continue using general knowledge surveys was driven by 
considerations of methodology and cost, not exact truth. His task was to decide whether it was worth 
ANES investing in an issue-specific knowledge survey; he concluded that the returns would not be large 
enough to justify the added length and cost such items would entail—at least with 1986 technology. 
(Today the cost would be trivial; one could use a computerized branching survey that asked citizens 
which issues they habitually pay attention to or think are important, and then ask knowledge questions 
about them.) Surveys designed to assess general political knowledge have helped cement it as the only 




informed, and worthy of representation (Elster 1986; Manin, Stein, and Mansbridge 1987, 349-
51; Cohen 1997, 76-78; Miller 2003). Thus, deliberative democratic decisions do not discard 
non-linguistic and subconsciously held information, as Pennington claims. Voters can make use 
of as wide and inclusive an information set as consumers do, granting markets no general 
advantage through this mechanism—and potentially giving the epistemic advantage to 
democracy, because of the deliberative process that precedes voting.  
Conversely, prices do not convey all the information necessary for making a fully rational 
choice about a buying decision. They primarily convey information relevant to the direct 
expenditures needed to bring a product to market, but they exclude a wealth of information that 
might be relevant to making a fully informed buying decision, such as the working conditions of 
those who produced the good, whether toxic or non-sustainable materials and techniques were 
used in its production, whether organized crime or barbaric regimes profit from its sale, and 
whether its production contributes to climate change or the degradation of ecological habitats. 
Important concerns such as these are actively obscured by the price mechanism.  
It may be argued that a combination of regulations and prohibitions can effectively price 
such externalities into what consumers pay, restoring the epistemic merit of prices. Yet this 
response makes precisely the mistake that Hayek (1945) thought social planners make: it 
assumes that central decision-making bodies can know enough to manage market activities well. 
It assumes that for every item for sale on the market, a central authority can know enough about 
its origins, ingredients, and externalities to convey that knowledge perfectly through prices that 
have been rationalized through regulation. The point here is not that regulation is pointless but 
rather that prices omit information that is relevant to making a fully rational buying decision 
when that information does not pertain to the basic costs of bringing a product to market.  
Markets and prices are epistemically inefficient because they discard information that 
might be necessary for making good decisions, all things considered—including, in particular, 
non-market values. This suggests a general limitation to the epistemic ability of markets. We can 
call this limitation a scarcity bias because it focuses attention exclusively on the immediate and 
unavoidable costs of bringing a good or service to market. Markets systematically bias attention 
so as to make overcoming scarcity as efficiently as possible the overriding criterion of good 
social arrangements—even when this involves neglecting or sacrificing other important values. It 
is well known that market exchanges involve externalities, yet the very language of 
“externalities” makes such instances sound discrete rather than systemic. Less noticed is that this 
constitutes an epistemic limitation of markets, since it suggests that markets will be 
systematically blind to problems other than scarcity and will over-rely on solutions to the 
problems they do recognize when these solutions involve giving people more things. Overall, 
this will bias social decision making in a direction that neglects other concerns.  
The reason for markets’ scarcity bias is not obscure. For our purposes, the problem 
centers on the oversimplification that prices introduce into the market choice situation. Where 
prices exclude information relevant to making a fully rational decision—that is, almost 
everywhere—the brute fact of scarcity privileges those goods that require the least material 
expenditure to bring to market. This orients the incentives of all market participants in a 
distinctly narrow way, focusing their concern almost exclusively on minimizing (material) costs 
and maximizing (material) gains.  
To point this out is anything but an indictment; this incentive structure has allowed 
market systems to eradicate extreme privation around the world. Yet for those whose basic 
material needs are now met, others of a non-material nature tend to arise (Inglehart 1977), and 
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markets have failed to deliver these with the same relentless alacrity as they deliver widgets. 
Prices discard precisely the kind of information that would be needed to provide the non-
materialist goods, such as environmental preservation and the protection of human rights, which 
have become especially important to those relatively insulated from basic scarcity. With respect 
to this class of goods, markets introduce a bias against the rational allocation of social resources. 
This constitutes a general epistemic limitation to market decision making, and one to which 
democracy is not systematically subject.  
Markets have proven themselves stunningly adept at resolving the problem of material 
scarcity. But this very facility suggests that where non-material concerns become paramount, 
markets are likely to misallocate social resources and bias outcomes against post- or non-
materialist values. By contrast, because voters are able to draw upon all the information and 
concerns they may have—both material and non-material—in making a voting decision, they are 
not vulnerable to the same bias. Democracy is able to make decisions that may seem 
economically suboptimal, such as protecting a nation’s forests from harvesting, yet are the best 
available choices when a wider set of concerns is weighed (which is what voters are able to do).  
 
 Indivisibility, Exclusivity, and Non-Substitutability 
The third argument for the epistemic superiority of markets is that democratic choice 
situations are uniquely difficult when compared with market decisions. I see two problems with 
this argument. One problem, the non-substitutability of markets for democracy, constitutes a 
second general epistemic limitation of markets. The other problem is the standard against which 
this argument holds markets and democracy, discussed in the next section. The first problem has 
to do with an inherent feature of collective decisions: their indivisibility (which DeCanio calls 
their exclusivity). DeCanio argues that this feature creates difficulties for democratic decision 
makers that have no parallel in market decisions. Yet in most cases, markets are incapable of 
substituting for democracy without begging essential policy questions; this constitutes a second 
fundamental limitation of markets.  
To see why, consider that indivisibility applies not only to the provision of non-
excludible public goods such as national defense, but also to laws that set down the constitutive 
rules of society. Abortion and birth control can only be legally available or not; racial minorities 
and LGBTQ people can be legally protected from discrimination or not; workers may organize 
legally or not; intellectual property can be recognized and protected or not. Centralized decision 
making also determines what kinds of contracts are legally enforceable.  
This is so far consistent with DeCanio’s claim that the inherently indivisible structure of 
democratic choice situations leads to epistemic disadvantages. But the idea of having an 
advantage only makes sense where there are alternatives. If markets cannot, even in principle, be 
substituted for democracy with respect to certain decisions—without begging the question the 
decision procedure is meant to answer—then markets cannot have any advantage over 
democracy in these areas, epistemic or otherwise. To think so is to make a category error.3  
                                                          
3 DeCanio is coy in never explicitly putting markets forward as an alternative to democracy (except 
perhaps in his last sentence), yet he structures his entire argument around such a comparison (DeCanio 
2014). This is apparent in his pairing of epistemically problematic features of political decisions with 
corresponding positive features of markets. Somin is not so careful and explicitly advocates leaving many 
more decisions to “foot voting in the private sector,” as he calls market decision making (Somin 2013, 
135). Pennington targets many of his comparisons at the “state” and only some against democracy 
(Pennington 2011). For more on Somin, see the symposium on his book in volume 27, nos. 3-4 of this 
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Markets cannot “decide” whether abortion is legal or not; they can only allow women to 
make this decision for themselves. Markets cannot “decide” whether discrimination is to be 
allowed or not—they allow people to discriminate based on their own prejudices. In cases like 
these, markets presuppose an answer to the underlying policy question and are therefore begging 
the question they are deployed to answer. Indeed, some of these decisions, such as those 
regarding contracts and intellectual property, serve to constitute the conditions making markets 
possible in the first place (Vanberg 1988, 19; Carpenter 2009). There is no way to disaggregate 
such cases to allow market decision making about them without begging the policy questions at 
issue. Markets are thus fundamentally incapable of deciding these kinds of issues; they cannot 
substitute for democracy at all in cases like these. Because they presuppose an answer to the 
relevant policy questions, they cannot properly be said to decide the questions at all. The 
consequence is that a great many decisions currently made by democracy are simply not 
amenable to market-based decision making as an alternative, rendering any talk of comparative 
advantage or disadvantage literally meaningless. 
This suggests a second general epistemic limitation of markets. Markets can serve as 
first-order institutions, deployed instrumentally to organize a particular area of social life, but 
they cannot serve as a second-order institution that decides which first-order institutions to use in 
a particular area. Yet this is not a problem for democracy. Democracy can serve as either a first-
order or second-order institution. Indeed, Jack Knight and James Johnson (2011) argue that the 
advantages of democracy accrue to it as a second-order institution, not a first-order one, and they 
admit that markets often make more sense than democracy on the first-order level. But because 
markets cannot, properly speaking, answer many important policy questions, they cannot 
constitute a true rival to democracy as a fundamental mechanism of social decision making, at 
least in cases such as these. 
This constitutes an important general epistemic limitation of markets since it rules out 
market decision making across a large number of issues. Neglecting or violating this limitation 
(if this were possible) would systematically bias collective decision making and the allocation of 
social resources. If we forget this point, we may suggest that markets can substitute for 
regulation or anti-discrimination legislation in order to manage these kinds of issues, despite the 
fact that doing so is already to decide the question, and thus to bias the ensuing patterns of social 
behavior in predictable ways.  
 
 Standards and Corrigibility 
The second problem with the choice-situation argument for markets is similarly fundamental and 
has to do with the standard to which democratic decisions are held, as opposed to market 
decisions.  
 DeCanio contends that democratic choices are more difficult than market choices 
because, in part, they bundle many policies together and lack a common metric for making 
tradeoffs among them. This is thought to present a daunting choice situation to voters, because 
voters need to know a lot about each policy and make choices among different policies if their 
electoral decisions are to meet a high epistemic standard. The problem here is twofold and has to 
do with the standard (or standards) used to conclude that democracy does worse than markets. 
First, democracy is held to the impossible standard of full rationality. Second, markets are often 
                                                          
journal and his response to the symposium (Somin 2015). For Pennington, see the symposium in volume 
28, nos. 3-4, and Pennington’s response (Pennington 2016). 
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unfairly held to a different and less demanding standard (derived from Austrian economics), 
which democracy would easily meet.  
For democracy to make good decisions, DeCanio argues, citizens must accurately predict 
the effects of rival candidates’ policy proposals, determine whether the effects are produced 
efficiently, and trade off effects in one policy area against those in another (DeCanio 2014, 640-
43). The standard invoked here is strikingly similar to that identified by Herbert Simon as the full 
rationality standard of economic decision theory, in which people must know about every 
alternative open to them, know the consequences likely to follow from each alternative, and have 
a complete set of preferences which guides them to the uniquely best choice (Simon 1976, 80). 
Thus, DeCanio (2014, 647) claims that, because of the problems discussed above, democracy 
fails to “rationally allocate” social resources. This implies that democracy is being held to the 
full rationality standard: it is being judged on the basis of whether it optimizes its decisions given 
all the alternatives open to it with respect to a complete set of preferences which fully specifies 
how to make all possible tradeoffs.  
The problem with this standard, as Simon, among others, has argued, is that it is an 
impossible one. Consequences are not just difficult but often impossible to predict and 
information is always limited. So, too, is our ability to value different outcomes, rendering our 
preferences incomplete (Simon 1976, 80-84).4 Due to these limitations, and because searching 
for information is costly, no human decisions meet the demanding standard of full rationality, 
whether in the market or in politics. An impossible standard is an inappropriate basis for 
evaluative purposes, since it violates the principle of “ought implies can.” It makes no sense to 
condemn people for failing to do something that they are incapable of doing. Since human beings 
cannot meet this standard, it is not an appropriate basis for evaluating their actions.  
Setting aside this important concern, we might ask whether people can at least approach 
the standard of full rationality more closely in markets than in democratic choice. We might 
doubt it, in light of a sizable body of research suggesting that market actors deviate 
systematically from full rationality in a host of serious ways (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Simon 1976; Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Kahneman 2011). This evidence renders makes it 
pointlessly speculative to attempt to answer the question of which of the two sorts of decision 
making more closely approximates full rationality. Perhaps in an effort to sidestep this difficulty, 
DeCanio unfairly holds markets to a different and less demanding standard. In Austrian 
economics, markets are “quasi-evolutionary“ and deploy trial and error via entrepreneurial 
discovery (Boettke 2008) so as to gradually, and not without failure, produce solutions to social 
problems (DeCanio 2014, 639-40). This conception of markets excuses any particular failure or 
suboptimal outcome as an error, and an error that is all but certain to be fixed in the fullness of 
time.  
Whether this is an accurate characterization of markets can be put aside for the moment. 
The first problem with using this conception in comparison with democracy is that it makes the 
comparison unfair. Both markets and democracy might fail to solve a particular problem, yet 
markets would pass this conception’s error-tolerant standard while democracy would have failed 
by the unforgiving standard of full rationality.  
                                                          
4 Pennington advocates a “robust political economy“ approach to designing political economic institutions 
which is premised upon accepting precisely these kinds of deviations from the ideal conditions of 
neoclassical economic theory (Pennington 2011). Such an approach would be less susceptible to the main 
critique in this section.  
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The Austrian conception of markets is, moreover, questionable. What justifies its 
confidence in the progressive character of markets? Suboptimal market equilibria are no less 
equilibria for the fact that they are suboptimal. Reaching equilibrium means that such situations 
are stable, and, absent an activist state, there is no actor with the power to unilaterally change it. 
If we also consider path dependence and simple inertia, we can understand how suboptimal 
market arrangements can become entrenched. In the meantime, conditions continue that I have 
been discussing in bloodless terms of failure and suboptima, but which amount to the 
unnecessary ruination of people’s lives by ameliorable financial crises, dysfunctional markets, 
monopolistic price gouging, and the like.  
Another problem with the Austrian standard is that if markets are to be praised for their 
ability to correct themselves when they fail, democracy should be praised as well. After all, 
openness to change and corrigibility is, especially in its reflexive form, held up as one of the key 
advantages of democracy by many theorists, particularly pragmatists (Popper 1966; Misak 2000; 
Talisse 2005; Knight and Johnson 2011). Whereas other regime types risk shaking the 
foundations of social order when the need for a drastic reversal of policy arises, democracies 
have the flexibility to throw out governing elites wedded to poorly performing policies without 
threatening the regime. To be sure, this point rests on comparing democracy to other forms of 
political rule, rather than to markets. But as we have seen, markets are often unable to substitute 
for democracy, so the comparison is appropriate for establishing that democracy shares the 
quality of self-correction with markets. If both democracy and markets meet this evolutionary, 
error-tolerant standard of epistemic performance, it cannot help us to gauge their relative 
epistemic merit.  
 
 The Effect of Uncertainty on Candidates and Parties 
The final (purported) epistemic advantage of markets is rooted in the contention that candidates 
and parties are not able to detect which of their proposed policies voters approve of in an election 
due to policy bundling, and so cannot supply what the voters demand, as can producers in a 
market who face disaggregated feedback.  
 There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is based on a naïve theory 
of democracy as pure responsiveness. No democratic theorist sees the job of representatives as 
simply providing voters what they want (Sabl 2015). This is largely because the responsiveness 
view assumes that voters’ preferences are to be taken in their raw form, unfiltered by deliberation 
or representation. This renders democracy unable to respond flexibly to emerging problems, 
fixing its actions in ways that contravene the advantages of representation (Manin 1997; Rehfeld 
2009).  
Instead of responsiveness, many theorists today endorse constructivist accounts of 
representation in which representation is characterized as a perpetual, two-way current of 
communication between representatives and ordinary citizens (Urbinati 2006; Disch 2011). On 
this account, citizens’ existing preferences and attitudes are communicated to representatives 
through a variety of means, including interest groups, mass media, direct communications (town 
halls, calls/letters from constituents, etc.), online petitioning and activism, protest, and traditional 
tools such as surveys and focus groups, all in addition to elections. The information from these 
sources comes to define a constrained action space within which representatives have discretion 
to exercise their judgment, and are punished if they stray beyond it (Key 1961, 264-66). 
Representatives, in turn, may seek to reshape that action space through persuasion and 
leadership, which may reconfigure popular opinion in ways that accommodate representatives’ 
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policy programs (Disch 2011). In constructivist accounts, representatives have many 
communication tools beyond the brute one of elections to discern which of their policies are 
popular. Representatives also have opportunities to convince voters that their policies cater to a 
need or desire the voters did not know they had, or to otherwise change what voters think, in 
much the same way that deliberation is thought to improve public opinion. This ability 
fundamentally alters the democratic choice situation in a way that short-circuits critiques 
premised upon representatives simply supplying what voters want.  
The second reason this argument does not establish an epistemic advantage for markets is 
that the uncertainty experienced by representatives regarding the popularity of the specific 
policies in their bundle should actually encourage better outcomes and more representative 
decisions. This is because representatives cannot know in advance which of their actions in 
office are likely to capture public attention and become widely known (Key 1961, 265-56). 
Should they use their office and power in ways that do not serve the interests of their 
constituents, and should these actions become known, they would expect electoral retribution. 
Because of their uncertainty regarding which actions will come to the public’s attention, there is 
an intense pressure for representatives to behave as if everything they do will become widely 
known. Drawing from the rich variety of sources of information about their constituents’ 
interests and concerns mentioned above, representatives should then be motivated to anticipate 
what will benefit their constituents when they make policy decisions.  
 
 *    *    * 
 
The epistemic merits of markets are easily oversold. Markets do an excellent job of solving a 
narrow set of problems, and it is understandable to hope that this performance could be 
generalized. Yet such hopes are misguided. Markets are incapable of replacing democracy 
wherever one decision must apply to all. Nor are markets freestanding or self-supporting, since 
they rely on a whole series of universally applicable political decisions that constitute the 
preconditions of markets’ existence. In the areas where markets can function, moreover, they 
introduce a scarcity bias into the social conditions they generate, denying a fair hearing to non- 
or post-materialist considerations.  
The epistemic case for democracy is also undersold by the champions of markets. We 
have seen that although democracy may fail the most stringent standards of rational choice, so, in 
many cases, do markets. Moreover, democracy may be able to do better than survey research 
suggests due to specialization, although more research on issue-specific political knowledge is 
needed for firm conclusions about this.  
The epistemic limits of markets can help us better understand where democracy and 
markets are best deployed in social decision making. Recall that the limit linked to the need for 
society-wide decisions suggests that markets cannot function as one of Knight and Johnson’s 
second-order institutions. They are instead first-order institutions, to be deployed when they are 
found to be more useful than alternative arrangements by a second-order institutional process, 
such as democracy, but not to substitute for such a process. Scarcity bias, too, suggests that 
certain limitations of markets can be epistemically beneficial insofar as they allow non-
materialistic concerns to come to the fore in the decision making of market actors. The limits 
discussed here therefore provide a fresh set of epistemic reasons to support interventions in 
market processes, though these might take a different form than those justified by traditional 
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